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UNEQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE: 
SOLLA V. BERLIN AND THE 
UNPRINCIPLED EVISCERATION 
OF NEW YORK’S EAJA 
 
Armen H. Merjian* 
 
The Legislature enacted the Equal Access to 
Justice Act to help litigants secure legal 
assistance to contest wrongful actions of state 
agencies.  By allowing victorious plaintiffs to gain 
attorneys’ fees, the statute seeks to help those 
whose rights have been violated but whose 
potential damage awards may not have been 
enough to induce lawyers to fight City Hall. 
 
New York Court of Appeals1 
 
[I]n civil proceedings involving fundamental 
human needs, it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for a person to be assured a fair 
outcome without a lawyer’s help.  As Chief Judge, 
I see this as one of the great challenges facing our 
justice system today.  No issue is more 
fundamental to our constitutional mandate of 
providing equal justice under law than ensuring 
adequate legal representation. 
 
Jonathan Lipmann, Chief Judge of the New York Court of 
 
* Member, New York and Connecticut Bars.  B.A. Yale University 1986; J.D. 
Columbia University 1990.  The author is a civil rights and poverty lawyer at 
Housing Works, Inc., the largest provider of HIV/AIDS services in the State 
of New York.  The author wishes to thank Elena Rodriguez for her assistance. 
1. Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (N.Y. 2003) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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Appeals2 
 
The basis for the common-law liability of the 
master or principal for the conduct of the servant 
or agent is stated in the Latin maxim, “qui facit 
per alium, facit per se”–”he who acts through 
another, acts through himself.” 
 
MODERN TORT LAW3 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“[L]et me remind you,” wrote the eminent constitutional 
scholar Charles L. Black, “that most successful and 
unsuccessful claims of infringement of human rights are made 
against the actions of state and local governments.”4  The state 
and local governments of New York are no exception to this 
phenomenon, particularly with regard to the State’s indigent 
citizens.  Myriad cases – many of them landmark cases – 
illustrate this principle.  For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
perhaps the most famous public assistance case in U.S. history, 
indigent New York City residents challenged the State’s 
termination of their public assistance benefits “without prior 
notice and hearing, thereby denying them due process of law.”5  
Ruling for the plaintiffs, the district court observed that “to cut 
off a welfare recipient in the face of . . . ‘brutal need’ without a 
prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable . . . .”6  The 
Supreme Court agreed, finding that the “termination of aid 
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive 
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he 
 
2. Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge, N.Y. Ct. App., Law Day Ceremony: 
Law in the 21st Century: Enduring Traditions, Emerging Challenges, at 17 
(May 3, 2010) [hereinafter Lippman], http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/LD10Tr 
anscript.pdf. 
3. BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 7:2 
(2d ed. 2013) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *417). 
4. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, 
NAMED AND UNNAMED 32 (1997). 
5. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256 (1970). 
6. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900 (S.D.N.Y 1968), aff’d, 
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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waits.”7 
Decades later, to take but another emblematic example, 
tens of thousands of indigent New York City residents living 
with AIDS challenged the failure of the State and City of New 
York to provide them with critical subsistence benefits in 
Henrietta D. v. Giuliani.8  “The extensive evidence proffered at 
trial,” the district court opined, “establishes unequivocally that 
defendants are chronically and systematically failing to provide 
plaintiffs with meaningful access to critical subsistence 
benefits and services, withdevastating consequences.”9 
The plaintiffs in these cases were fortunate: they managed 
to secure legal representation.  For most indigent plaintiffs, 
that is sadly not the case, as New York’s Chief Judge has 
explained: 
 
If they are very fortunate, a small number of 
these litigants may be represented by one of the 
civil legal services programs that provide free 
representation to low-income New Yorkers.  But, 
because of lack of resources, more and more of 
these programs must turn away potential clients.  
Some who are turned away may find 
representation from pro bono programs, but our 
State’s lawyers, who already donate an 
estimated two million hours of pro bono work a 
year, cannot by themselves possibly fill the huge 
gap that still exists.10 
 
In stark contrast, the State of New York, when sued, 
enlists the help of the Attorney General: “Over 650 Assistant 
Attorneys General and over 1,700 employees, including forensic 
accountants, legal assistants, scientists, investigators and 
support staff serve in the Office of the Attorney General in 
many locations across New York State.”11  The disparity in 
 
7. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. 
8. Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d 
sub nom. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 291 (2d Cir. 2003). 
9. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
10. Lippman, supra note 2, at 16. 
11. Our Office, ATT’Y GEN. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
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resources between the average citizen – to say nothing of 
indigent citizens – and the government in litigation is often 
profound.12 
Article 86 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, 
otherwise known as the Equal Access to Justice Act, or “EAJA,” 
was designed to address this disparity.13  EAJA authorizes “the 
recovery of counsel fees and other reasonable expenses in 
certain actions against the state of New York.”14  The New 
York Legislature enacted EAJA to help indigent litigants and 
small businesses secure the legal assistance that they could not 
otherwise afford in order to contest the wrongful actions of 
state agencies.15 “The purpose of the EAJA is to reduce the 
economic imbalance between an individual claimant and the 
 
our-office.  New York City’s Law Department, meanwhile, “is staffed with 690 
lawyers and 850 support professionals in 10 offices located in all five 
boroughs[.]”  New York City Law Department, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/company/new-york-city-law-department. 
12. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act – A Qualified Success, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 458, 463 (1993) 
(“The government can marshal more resources in litigation than can most 
private noninstitutional parties.  Indeed, the government’s sheer size may 
give it an unfair advantage in litigation, much like that which General 
Motors or Exxon enjoy over smaller adversaries.  Private parties may not be 
able to afford protracted litigation against the government, as plaintiffs or 
defendants, because of this comparative lack of resources.”); Macon 
Dandridge Miller, Comment, Catalysts as Prevailing Parties Under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1347, 1365 (2002) (“A disparity exists 
because of the government’s greater resources and expertise.”).  Congress 
noted as much in passing the federal EAJA statute:  “While the influence of 
the bureaucracy over all aspects of life has increased, the ability of most 
citizens to contest any unreasonable exercise of authority has decreased.  
Thus, at the present time, the Government with its greater resources and 
expertise can in effect coerce compliance with its position.”  H.R. REP. NO. 96-
1418, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 1980 WL 12964. 
13. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8600 (McKinney 2015). 
14. Id. The statute provides that a court “shall” award attorneys’ fees 
and expenses to a prevailing party in civil actions against New York State, 
with limited exceptions: “[E]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by 
statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party, other than the state, fees 
and other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against 
the state, unless the court finds that the position of the state was 
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8601(a) (McKinney 2015). 
15. EAJA is limited to individuals with a net worth under $50,000; (ii) 
businesses with no more than 100 employees; and tax-exempt organizations.  
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8602(d) (McKinney 2015).  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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[government] in order to reduce the likelihood that challenges 
to unreasonable bureaucratic actions will be deterred by the 
high cost of litigating against the Government.”16  As the New 
York Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) has explained, “the 
statute seeks to help those whose rights have been violated but 
whose potential damage awards may not have been enough to 
induce lawyers to fight City Hall.”17  In addition, like all fee-
shifting statutes, New York’s EAJA serves as a deterrent to 
those who might otherwise violate the law with impunity.18 
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Solla v. 
Berlin radically upends this design.  Solla unjustly forecloses 
access to the courts in numerous cases where the State’s 
agents—local municipalities administering public assistance 
benefits—have violated the rights of indigent New Yorkers and 
disregarded directives that the State has wrongfully failed to 
enforce.19  As we shall see, this is in fact an all-too-common 
 
16. Reyes v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 807 F. Supp. 293, 297 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).  See, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989) 
(citations omitted) (“Congress passed the [analogous federal] EAJA in 
response to its concern that persons ‘may be deterred from seeking review of, 
or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the 
expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights.’”); N.Y. State 
Clinical Lab. Ass’n., Inc. v. Kaladjian, 649 N.E.2d 811, 813 (N.Y. 1995) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Governor’s Approval Mem, L 1989, ch 770, 1989 
NYLegisAnn, at 336) (“The statute was enacted to ‘improv[e] access to justice 
for individuals and businesses who may not have the resources to sustain a 
long legal battle against an agency that is acting without justification.’”); 
Solla v. Berlin, 961 N.Y.S.2d 55, 59 (App. Div. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 
27 N.E.3d 462, 465 (N.Y. 2015) (“The ‘spirit and purpose’ of the 
State EAJA are clear.  The Legislature desired to level the playing field for 
those without the necessary resources to challenge State action through 
litigation.”). 
17. Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (N.Y. 2003) (citation 
omitted). 
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Blum, 448 N.E.2d 449, 458 (N.Y. 1983) (citation 
omitted) (“[The Supreme Court] has also recognized that the imposition of 
attorney’s fees would help to insure that those who violate . . . fundamental 
laws could not proceed with impunity.”); Annabelle Chan, Note, The 
Buckhannon Stops Here: Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources Should Not Apply to 
the New York Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1375-76 
(2004) (“[C]itizen suits against the sovereign function as an important check 
on government.  These suits deter improper government actions, allow 
private citizens to protect their own interests, and achieve important public 
policy goals.”). 
19. Solla, 27 N.E.3d at 462. 
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occurrence. 
Solla is noteworthy not merely in light of the baleful 
effects of its ruling, but because of its reasoning: it is 
categorically wrong.  The decision wholly elides a cornerstone 
and settled principle of New York welfare law, namely, that in 
the administration of public assistance, the municipalities act 
as the agents of the State, while blatantly violating the most 
fundamental of agency principles, namely, that a principal is 
vicariously liable for the actions of its agent acting within the 
scope of its authority.  Indeed, this principal/agent relationship 
is established both by statute and by decades of uniform state 
and federal rulings, specifically with regard to public 
assistance and the EAJA statute.  This includes, ironically, 
Court of Appeals decisions directly on point, as we shall see.  In 
the realm of public welfare law, it is difficult to overstate the 
enormity, and the clarity, of the court’s error. 
To make matters worse, the court additionally misstated—
and thereby severely restricted—the requisite criteria for 
determining a prevailing party under EAJA pursuant to the 
“catalyst theory.”20  The court then proceeded to rule against 
Ms. Solla on the basis of this erroneous and unduly restrictive 
criteria.21 
Section II of this article provides an overview of the 
relevant social services law.  Section II.A. discusses the 
established principle that municipalities act as the agents of 
the State of New York in the administration of public 
assistance benefits.  Section II.B. describes the fair hearing 
process in New York, while Section II.C. examines the chronic 
failure of State officials to enforce fair hearing decisions.  
Section III analyzes the decision of New York’s highest court in 
Solla v. Berlin, providing a brief summary of the case (Section 
III.A.), and highlighting the court’s errors with respect to both 
vicarious liability (Section III.B.) and the catalyst theory 
(Section III.C.).  A short conclusion follows in Section IV. 
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT NEW YORK 
SOCIAL SERVICES LAW 
 
20. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
21. Solla, 27 N.E.3d at 465. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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A. City and State: Agent and Principal 
 
States have a choice in the manner in which they 
administer their social welfare programs: they can either 
utilize a single state agency to do so, or they can employ local 
agencies acting as their agents to disburse benefits and 
administer those programs.22  New York has chosen the 
latter,23 engaging a total of “58 local social services districts 
under the general supervision of the [New York State Office of 
Temporary and Disability Assistance, or OTDA] and the State 
Commissioner of [OTDA].”24  This is a critical factor in the 
analysis that follows: in administering public assistance 
benefits, local districts act on behalf of and in the place of 
OTDA.  The districts perform the tasks that the State would 
have to perform if it opted to utilize a single state agency for 
this purpose: operating welfare centers, processing 
applications, determining eligibility, conferring benefits, and 
serving beneficiaries on a day-to-day basis. 
Accordingly, New York Social Services Law expressly 
establishes that in administering public assistance benefits, 
the local district is the “agent” of the State: “The county 
commissioner shall act as the agent of the department [i.e., 
OTDA] in all matters relating to assistance and care 
administered or authorized by the town public welfare 
officers.”25  The Social Services Law reinforces this 
 
22. See, e.g., M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (citations omitted) (“States may directly administer these programs or 
may delegate the administration to agencies of local government, subject to 
state supervision.”); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 506 F.3d 183, 199 (2d Cir. 
2007) (“States participating in the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs may 
choose one of two ways in which to administer benefits:  designate a single 
State agency to implement the programs, or operate the programs on a 
decentralized basis using local agencies.”). 
23. See, e.g., Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (“New York has chosen to 
administer the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts on a decentralized basis. . . .”); 
Moore v. Perales, No. CV-85-1638, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20995, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y.) (May 3, 1990) (“The state has chosen to administer these programs 
through local agencies, including the City Agency.”). 
24. Beaudoin v. Toia, 380 N.E.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. 1978). 
25. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 65(3) (McKinney 1997) (emphasis added). 
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principal/agent relationship by mandating that the State 
“supervise all social services work, as the same may be 
administered by any local unit of government and the social 
services officials thereof within the state, advise them in the 
performance of their official duties and regulate the financial 
assistance granted by the state in connection with said work.”26  
Similarly, the law provides that the Commissioner of OTDA 
shall “exercise general supervision over the work of all local 
welfare authorities.”27 
The State, as principal, is required to “determine the 
policies and principles upon which public assistance, services 
and care shall be provided within the state both by the state 
itself and by the local governmental units . . . .”28  Further, the 
State is authorized: 
 
to promulgate any regulations the commissioner 
determines are necessary . . . and to withhold or 
deny state reimbursement, in whole or in part, 
from or to any social services district, in the 
event of the failure of any such district to comply 
with such regulations relating to such district’s 
organization, administration, management or 
program.29 
 
The State’s duty to supervise the local agencies in the 
provision of public assistance is also established in the federal 
statutes governing the Food Stamp, Medicaid, and Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Family (“TANF”) programs.30  These 
statutes make it clear that the State bears the ultimate 
responsibility for providing the benefits in questions and for 
complying with the law.  The Food Stamp Act (“FSA”), for 
example, provides that the “State agency of each participating 
State shall have responsibility for certifying applicant 
 
26. Id. § 20(2)(b) (McKinney 2014). 
27. Id. § 34(3)(d) (McKinney 1994). 
28. Id. § 17(a) (McKinney 2007) (emphasis added). 
29. Id. § 20(3)(f) (McKinney 2014). 
30. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(4), 1396a(5) 
(2012). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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households and issuing EBT cards.”31  The statute expressly 
states that the “responsibility of the agency of the State 
government shall not be affected by whether the program is 
operated on a State-administered or county-administered 
basis.”32 
In addition, the implementing regulations mandate that 
“[e]ach State agency shall ensure that project areas operate the 
Food Stamp Program in accordance with the Act, regulations, 
and FNS-approved State Plan of Operation.”33 To ensure 
compliance with program requirements, the regulations 
require states to conduct reviews in order “to measure 
compliance with the provisions of FNS regulations.”34  This 
includes providing “a systematic method of monitoring and 
assessing program operations in the project [i.e., the local] 
areas,”35 and “a continuing flow of information between the 
project areas, the States, and FNS, necessary to develop the 
solutions to problems in program policy and procedures.”36  The 
regulations also provide that the “State agency shall ensure 
that corrective action plans are prepared at the project area . . . 
level . . . .”37 
The legislative history of the FSA further supports this 
conclusion: 
 
In essence, state welfare agencies are responsible 
for the day-to-day administration of the food 
stamp program (under Federal rules) and a 
substantial portion of their administrative costs.  
In a number of states, these responsibilities are 
passed down to local welfare agencies because of 
the structure of the state’s welfare system.  The 
state, however, remains ultimately responsible 
and is the unit with which the [United States 
 
31. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(1). 
32. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(2). 
33. 7 C.F.R. § 275.5(a) (2015). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. § 275.5(a)(1) (2015). 
36. Id. § 275.5(a)(3) (2015). 
37. Id. § 275.18(a) (2015). 
9
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Department of Agriculture] deals.38 
 
Not surprisingly, then, courts examining the FSA’s provisions 
have concluded that they “impose an enforceable duty on the 
State to supervise the City’s administration of the Food Stamp 
program in New York City”39 and to “ensure that Plaintiffs 
timely receive their food stamps.”40 
The Medicaid statute similarly requires states to “provide 
for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to 
administer or to supervise the administration of the plan.”41  
And the TANF statute requires a “certification by the chief 
executive officer of the State specifying which State agency or 
agencies will administer and supervise the program . . . .”42  
Like the FSA, these statutes likewise impose a duty upon the 
State to supervise the local districts’ administration of the 
programs.43 
 
38. H.R. REP. NO. 95-464, at 299 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1978, 2235 (emphasis added). 
39. Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See 
also M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (food 
stamp program is “subject to state supervision”); Williston, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 
568 (“The FSA is clear in its conferral of responsibility onto the State to 
administer, supervise, and review the distribution of food stamp assistance to 
applicants at each local agency. . . .  Further, the implementing regulations 
impose a duty on the State to supervise the City’s acts or failures to act.”); 
Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2743, at *62 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (“[T]he Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts require 
participating states to administer these programs and actively supervise local 
agencies to ensure compliance.”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 F.3d 183 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
40. Williston, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 569. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(5) (2012). The governing regulations require that 
state agencies take final action on fair hearing decisions within 90 days.  See 
42 C.F.R. § 431.244(f)(1) (2012). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (2012). 
43. See, e.g., K.C. ex rel. Africa H. v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107, 112 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (explaining the Medicaid statute’s “vesting of responsibility over a 
state's Medicaid program in a single agency . . .”); Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 
F.3d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1808 (citations 
omitted) (“Any state that participates in Medicaid must designate ‘a 
single State agency’ (‘State agency’) to administer—or to supervise the 
administration of—the state’s Medicaid plan.  Although the State agency may 
delegate to local entities the performance of certain responsibilities, the State 
agency must (1) ‘[h]ave methods to keep itself currently informed of the 
adherence of local [entities] to the State plan provisions and the agency’s 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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Given that this legal relationship is expressly established 
in both the state and federal statutory schemes, courts 
interpret these statutes uniformly to impose liability upon the 
State for the local agencies’ actions (or inactions) in the 
administration of public assistance benefits.  Indeed, nearly 
four decades ago, the Court of Appeals explained: 
 
The county commissioners are denominated by 
statute “agents” of the State department (Social 
Services Law, § 65, subd 3).  In the 
administration of public assistance funds, 
whether they come from Federal, State or local 
sources, the authority and responsibility is that 
of the county commissioners of social services, 
not the counties; the local commissioners act on 
behalf of and as agents for the State.  Each is a 
part of and the local arm of the single State 
administrative agency.44 
 
Thirteen years later, the Court of Appeals reiterated this 
holding.  Examining the now-defunct federal AFDC program, 
which is wholly analogous to the Food Stamp and Medicaid 
programs described above, the court explained, in a unanimous 
decision: 
 
[T]he AFDC administrative scheme creates an 
interconnected and inextricable chain of 
authority, with ultimate power reposed in the 
 
procedures for determining eligibility’ and (2) ‘[t]ake corrective action to 
ensure their adherence.’”); Hillburn ex rel. Hilburn v. Maher, 795 F.2d 252, 
261 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (“[T]he reason for the requirement that 
a state designate a ‘single State agency’ to administer its Medicaid program 
was to avoid a lack of accountability for the appropriate operation of the 
program.”); Gray Panthers v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-2307, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78335, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009) (citations omitted) (“The state 
must designate a ‘single state agency’ to be responsible for administration 
and supervision of the state plan.  Once designated as the single state agency 
for Medicaid, this agency may not delegate the administration of the program 
or any activities related to rule-making and policy development to any entity 
other than its own officials.”); M.K.B., 445 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (citations 
omitted) (Medicaid and TANF programs are “subject to state supervision”). 
44. Beaudoin v. Toia, 380 N.E.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. 1978) (emphasis added). 
11
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State DSS.  The State, under Federal and State 
law, has the duty to supervise AFDC plans and is 
authorized to sanction local districts for failure to 
comply with State DSS rules.  Local social 
service commissioners “act on behalf of and as 
agents for the State.  Each is a part of and the 
local arm of the single State administrative 
agency.”45 
 
As we have just seen, this remains the case under both the 
State Social Services Law and under the federal programs that 
OTDA administers.46  Indeed, the Court of Appeals again 
confirmed this principle eleven years later, noting, “we have 
recognized that local social services commissioners act as 
agents for the State.”47  New York’s intermediate appellate 
courts have repeatedly reached the same conclusion,48 as have 
the federal courts.49 
 
45. Thomasel v. Perales, 585 N.E.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. 1991) (citations 
omitted). 
46. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Tormos v. 
Hammons, 687 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337 (App. Div. 1999) (citations omitted) 
(“Under the Federal and State statutory schemes, State social service 
agencies have complete supervisory authority over the local departments.  . . . 
[T]he local departments function ‘as agents of the State and not of their 
respective counties’. . . . ”). 
47. Hernandez v. Hammons, 780 N.E.2d 498, 499 (N.Y. 2002) (citation 
omitted).  See also Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270, 1270 n.3 (N.Y. 2003). 
48. See, e.g., Miller v. DeBuono, 709 N.Y.S.2d 391, 144 (App. Div. 
2000) (“it is well settled that the City agency acts on behalf of the State 
agency . . . .”); Tormos, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 337; Mitchell v. Bane, 630 N.Y.S.2d 
495, 497 (App. Div. 1995); Cleary v. Perales, 594 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (App. Div. 
1993) (City’s “denial of the benefit was determined as an agent of the State 
respondent, which bears the final responsibility”); Unger v. Blum, 498 
N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (App. Div. 1986); N.Y. St. Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Fortier, 483 
N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (App. Div. 1984). 
49. See, e.g., Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“New York State is also liable to guarantee that those it delegates to carry 
out its programs satisfy the terms of its promised performance, including 
compliance with the [law].”); Strouchler v. Shah, 286 F.R.D. 244, 245 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (home care services are “administered by the State through 
its agent the City using Medicaid dollars.”); Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. 
Supp. 2d 561, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 
181, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003), (citations 
omitted) (“[U]nder New York State law, State defendant has a duty to 
supervise City defendants in the provision of public benefits and services.  
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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As discussed in Section II.B, finally, the Court of Appeals 
has established this principle with respect to the award of 
attorneys’ fees in particular, and New York courts have 
consistently done so with respect to a local agent’s failure to 
comply with the State’s decisions after fair hearing 
(“DAFHs”).50 
 
B. The Fair Hearing Process 
 
In the aforementioned Goldberg v. Kelly,51 the Supreme 
Court ruled that recipients of public assistance have a 
constitutional right to a hearing prior to termination of their 
benefits.52  In New York, the right to challenge the actions and 
inactions of social service officials through a “fair hearing” is 
codified in the Social Services Law, which expressly provides 
that recipients “may appeal to the department [i.e., OTDA] 
from decisions of social services officials or failures to make 
decisions. . . .”53  The statute provides that the “department 
shall review the case and give such person an opportunity for a 
fair hearing thereon.”54 
OTDA employs approximately 140 hearing officers55 to 
conduct these fair hearings and to render decisions pursuant to 
the social services law.56  These DAFHs are binding upon the 
 
Indeed, in the administration of public assistance funds, the ‘local 
commissioners act on behalf of and as agents for the State.’”); Meachem v. 
Wing, 77 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[City is] the designee of State 
authority . . . [and] . . . its agent.”); Swift v. Blum, 502 F. Supp. 1140, 
1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citations omitted) (“The state commissioner is 
responsible, pursuant to statute, for the actions of the county 
commissioners.”). 
50. See infra Section III.B. 
51. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
52. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
53. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22(1) (McKinney 2014). 
54. Id. 
55. Stephen Loffredo & Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case 
for a Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 273, 
284 (2009). 
56. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22(2) (“[T]he commissioner may designate 
and authorize one or more appropriate members of his staff to consider and 
decide such appeals.  Any staff member so designated and authorized shall 
have authority to decide such appeals on behalf of the commissioner with the 
same force and effect as if the commissioner had made the decisions.”). 
13
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social services districts.57  Governing regulations establish that 
definitive and final administrative action on those decisions 
must be taken promptly, and no later than in 90 days from the 
date of the fair hearing request.58  As the court in Williston v. 
Eggleston explained, “[t]he fair hearing process represents an 
important aspect of the State’s supervision of the local districts’ 
compliance with program requirements.”59 
Federal laws similarly establish the right to a fair hearing.  
Hence, Medicaid law requires that states “provide for granting 
an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any 
individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is 
denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness.”60  
Similarly, the FSA provides that States must grant “a fair 
hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any 
household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under 
any provision of its plan of operation.”61 
Finally, as the governing statutes and regulations 
mandate, and as numerous courts examining the issue have 
concluded, “[i]t is the state . . . that is ultimately responsible for 
ensuring that a fair hearing is held and that [timely] 
compliance with the DAFH is accomplished through the local 
agencies.”62  Indeed, in the event that the districts fail to 
 
57. See Id. § 22(9)(a) (“All decisions of the commissioner pursuant to this 
section shall be binding upon the social services districts involved and shall 
be complied with by the social services officials thereof.”). 
58. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-6.4(a) (2015) (“For all 
decisions, except those involving food stamp issues only, definitive and final 
administrative action must be taken promptly, but in no event more than 90 
days from the date of the request for a fair hearing.”). 
59. Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2012). 
61. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2012).  The implementing regulations 
reinforce this obligation.  See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(b) (2015) (“Each State agency 
shall provide for either a fair hearing at the State level or for a hearing at the 
local level which permits the household to further appeal a local decision to a 
State level fair hearing.”). 
62. Moore v. Perales, 692 F. Supp. 137, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).  See also 
Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (state 
agency “remains responsible . . . for ensuring the fair hearing system’s 
compliance with federal law and regulations.”); Cincotta v. N.Y.C. Human 
Res. Admin., No. 00 Civ. 9064, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11457, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 9, 2001) (citations omitted) (“The State, however, is ultimately 
responsible for compliance with the requirements of the FSA.”); Morel v. 
Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Roberta G. v. Perales, No. 90 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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comply with a DAFH, the governing regulations oblige the 
State to “secure compliance by whatever means is deemed 
necessary and appropriate under the circumstances of the 
case.”63 
Each year, OTDA receives hundreds of thousands of fair 
hearing requests.64  Sadly, because there is no right to 
representation in these cases,65 nearly 95% of individuals 
appear without representation at fair hearings.66  Many find 
this process so daunting that they choose not to contest the 
local agency’s actions at all, as a New York State Bar 
Association report concluded: “It takes a fair amount of 
confidence and fortitude for unsophisticated people to come 
forward to dispute the local agency decision.  Countless 
thousands lose desperately needed governmental benefits to 
which they are entitled because they do not contest the local 
decision.”67  When beneficiaries do manage to contest those 
 
Civ. 3485, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16304 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992). 
63. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-6.4(c) (2015).  See, e.g., In 
re Shvartszayd, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1995, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. June 26, 
1995), aff’d sub nom. Shvartszayd v. Dowling, 656 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. 
Div. 1997) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Bane, Nos. 401044/93, 
401045/93, 1993 WL 13717602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 1993) (Trial Order)) 
(“[T]he state was obliged in the first instance to see that their lawful rulings 
were complied with.  And if this did not happen, then they were bound to 
ascertain expeditiously the reason why and take immediate steps to remedy 
the situation.”). 
64. Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 56, at 284 (“Each year, OTDA 
receives over 200,000 requests for ‘fair hearings’ . . . .”).  See also Espinosa v. 
Shah, No. 09 Civ. 4103, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168875, at *5 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 5, 2014) (“In calendar year 2013, for all programs, [the New York Office 
of Administrative Hearings] received 326,872 requests for fair hearings, 
scheduled 348,820 fair hearings, and issued 125,515 fair hearing decisions.”). 
65. See Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 56 (for an excellent discussion 
of the need for representation at these proceedings). 
66. Project FAIR (Fair Hearing Assistance, Information, and Referral), 
THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y, https://www.legal-aid.org/en/civil/civilpractice/projectfa 
ir.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2015)(“In the hundreds of State administrative 
fair hearings held each day to resolve problems involving public benefits, 
almost 95% of individuals appear without representation or assistance.”). 
67. TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, 
REPORT 177 (Jul. 14, 1988).  See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 
(1970) (“[The welfare recipient’s] need to concentrate upon finding the means 
for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress 
from the welfare bureaucracy.”); Mayer v. Wing, 922 F. Supp. 902, 909 n.8 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Russell J. Hanks, Deputy General Counsel in charge of the 
State Defendant’s Office of Administrative Hearings, estimates that only 
15
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decisions, however, and to prevail, they face yet another great 
challenge: securing enforcement of a favorable DAFH, as the 
next section reveals. 
 
C. The Recurrent Failure of State Officials to Enforce 
Favorable Fair Hearing Decisions 
 
To understand the ramifications of the court’s decision in 
Solla, it is critical to note the frequency with which the State 
demonstrably fails to ensure compliance with its fair hearing 
decisions, particularly in cases involving public assistance, and 
the severity of the resulting consequences. 
It is sadly common in New York for an individual to win a 
fair hearing, only to see the State fail to secure timely 
compliance—or, at times, any compliance at all—from its 
agent.  That is precisely what happened in Solla,68 and in fact 
in several of the EAJA cases examined here.69  The evidence is 
not, however, merely anecdotal.  In Shakhnes v. Eggleston, for 
example, the court found that the plaintiffs, a class of New 
York City Medicaid recipients, “have proffered substantial 
evidence that the City systematically fails to implement fair 
hearing decisions on a timely basis.”70  Plaintiffs proffered 
evidence demonstrating “striking noncompliance,” with timely 
compliance achieved in only 2% of cases, and fully 91% taking 
more than 150 days to secure compliance.71  While the 
applicants wait, the court noted, “they may face medical 
choices that reach into all aspects of their lives – whether to 
move in with family, or out of State, or to sell a home, or simply 
whether to purchase pain-easing treatment.”72 
In Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, to take another example, the 
court examined the claims of tens of thousands of indigent 
plaintiffs living with AIDS, clients of the New York City 
 
about ten to twenty percent of individuals who receive a notice of reduction 
request a fair hearing.”). 
68. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., infra notes 130-32, 136 and accompanying text. 
70. Shakhnes v. Eggleston, 740 F. Supp. 2d 602, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
aff’d in part, vac’d in part, Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2012). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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Division of AIDS Services and Income Support, or “DASIS.”73  
The court ruled, following a bench trial, that DASIS “often—
even in a majority of cases—fails to comply with fair hearing 
decisions for months or even over a year.”74  “Even where 
plaintiffs prevail at fair hearings,” the court found, “the 
evidence shows that City defendants often delay compliance 
with the courts’ directives or ignore the decisions altogether.”75  
Indeed, Plaintiffs proffered evidence that “ensuring compliance 
[with favorable fair hearing decisions] was a struggle in up to 
seventy-five percent of cases.”76  As the court observed: “Mr. 
John Maher, DASIS’ deputy director of field operations, 
admitted that even where a DASIS client wins a fair hearing 
concluding that DASIS wrongfully reduced or terminated the 
client’s benefits, if ‘we believe we did theright thing, we take 
the action again.’”77 
Three years earlier, the New York City Bar Association 
noted “a total breakdown in the city’s ability to comply with 
fair hearings when the caseworkers make improper 
determinations to discontinue or deny benefits to recipients.”78  
The State repeatedly issues DAFHs overturning those 
determinations, the Association observed, 
 
and still the recipient goes without the mandated 
benefits because the City refuses or fails to 
withdraw its original action and comply with the 
State’s directive to provide those benefits.  
Former recipients wait months, sometimes years, 
for the local agency to comply with their fair 
 
73. Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), 
aff’d sub nom. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003).  
DASIS, now known as the HIV/AIDS Services Administration, or “HASA,” is 
a division of the New York City Human Resources Administration, or “HRA.” 
HUMAN RES. ADMIN.,  HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN RESOURCES 
ADMINISTRATION 6 (2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/html/hra/downloads/pdf/about/ 
history_of_welfare_and_hra.pdf. 
74. Giuliani., 119 F. Supp. 2d 181 at 215. 
75. Id. at 217. 
76. Id. at 199. 
77. Id. 
78. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Pataki Welfare Plan, 52 REC. 
13, 24 (1997). 
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hearing decisions, all the while without the 
benefits for which they are clearly eligible.79 
 
That same year, a class of indigent New Yorkers filed suit 
alleging that “delays by the City in complying with the DAFH’s 
and the State’s non-enforcement of those DAFH’s have caused 
them a great deal of suffering, which continues to this day.”80  
Plaintiffs’ counsel “cited statistics showing that delays in 
complying with DAFHs and enforcing these DAFHs is the rule 
rather than the exception.”81  Plus ҫ a change. 
These cases and reports demonstrate a recurrent and often 
systemic failure by the State to ensure compliance with its fair 
hearing decisions.  The brutal and at times life-threatening 
consequences of this failure, however, cannot be gleaned from 
the statistical evidence.  They are, instead, apparent in the 
harrowing accounts that the individual plaintiffs relate each 
time the City ignores a DAFH, and each time the State fails to 
secure compliance with that DAFH.82 
Henry Bradley’s experience is illustrative.  Mr. Bradley 
was a 51 year-old man living with AIDS and a host of 
attendant maladies when he went to trial in Henrietta D. v. 
Giulliani.83  Over and over again, DASIS wrongfully 
terminated Mr. Bradley’s public assistance benefits, often 
without notice.  For instance, “[a]fter initially funding Mr. 
Bradley’s housing, DASIS closed his case without notice in 
February, 1994.”84  Mr. Bradley won DAFH that ordered 
DASIS to reopen the case and pay the benefits due 
retroactively.  “Despite the fair hearing decision, DASIS did not 
 
79. Id. 
80. Piron v. Wing, N.Y.L.J., June 27, 1997, at 26 (App. Div. June 27, 
1997). 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., id. (“Here, it is clear that all of the plaintiffs and their 
families have suffered enormously from the delay in receiving moneys they 
are entitled to.  They claim, without dispute, that they are lacking funds for 
food, clothing and furniture and in some cases fear eviction.  Their injury is 
irreparable and continues until payment is received.”). 
83. Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp.2d 181, 186-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), 
aff’d sub nom. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003). At the 
time, Mr. Bradley followed “a medication regimen that require[d] taking fifty-
one different tablets, plus liquid supplements, daily.”  Id. at 187.  
84. Id. at 187. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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pay the rent arrears and Mr. Bradley lost his apartment.”85  
Because his case was wrongfully closed, during this same 
period, “Mr. Bradley’s Medicaid was not active, and he was 
unable to maintain his medication regimen.”86 
Each time DASIS wrongfully closed Mr. Bradley’s public 
assistance case, he was left without a shelter allowance, cash 
assistance, food stamps, or medical assistance.  “During this 
time without public benefits, Mr. Bradley relied primarily on 
church charity in order to live.”87  Mr. Bradley repeatedly won 
fair hearing decisions, but DASIS simply ignored them, and the 
State failed to secure compliance with its decisions.88 
At one point, Mr. Bradley “was not able to follow his 
medication regime for over two years.  As a result, his health 
deteriorated, affecting his vision, and multiplying his regimen 
from 3 tablets per day to seventeen tablets three times per 
day.”89  From August 1996 until March 1998, to take but one 
additional example, Mr. Bradley went without food stamps 
after the state failed to secure DASIS’ compliance with yet 
another fair hearing decision in his favor. 
In each of these instances, Mr. Bradley managed to file for 
and win a fair hearing ordering DASIS to restore his critical 
subsistence benefits.  Over and over again, the State failed to 
enforce those decisions, with devastating consequences.  As the 
court summarized in its post-trial decision: 
 
[B]ecause DASIS’ [sic] failed to properly assist 
Mr. Bradley, he was deprived of critical 
subsistence benefits, to which he was fully 
entitled, for years.  As a result of DASIS’ 
unwillingness or inability to correct his case, Mr. 
Bradley was repeatedly unable to access his 
Medicaid benefits, at one point for approximately 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id.  Mr. Bradley testified that he was forced “to go to different 
churches and sit around the street and wait for people to come with bags so 
that you could get something to eat because I didn’t know what I was going to 
do.”  Id. at 191. 
88. Id. at 187-90. 
89. Id. at 188. 
19
 2015 UNEQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE 83 
two years.  Without Medicaid, he was unable to 
take his medication, causing his toenails, 
fingernails, and even his teeth to fall out.  DASIS 
failed to make any rent payments on behalf of 
Mr. Bradley for almost two years, and DASIS 
failed to provide Mr. Bradley with any food 
stamps for almost two years.  During this time, 
Mr. Bradley was unfairly compelled to pay nearly 
three-quarters of his monthly SSI income toward 
rent, leaving him little money on which to live 
and forcing him, inter alia, to go to soup kitchens 
merely to survive.  Mr. Bradley’s right to these 
benefits was unequivocally established in fair 
hearing proceedings, which DASIS repeatedly 
chose to ignore.90 
 
As we have seen, nearly 95% of public assistance recipients 
lack legal representation in their fair hearings.91  For the 
intrepid few who manage to challenge the local agency and 
win, the only recourse when the City fails to comply and the 
State breaches its obligation to secure compliance is to file a 
lawsuit against the City and State.92  The need for 
representation in such litigation is even greater than at the fair 
hearing level.  As two leading commentators have concluded, 
“it is nearly impossible for an unrepresented party—especially 
one in the throes of the existential crisis typically occasioned by 
a loss of subsistence benefits—to mount such a challenge in the 
courts.”93  In Solla, however, the Court of Appeals turned 
decades of settled law (to say nothing of the relevant and 
controlling statutes) on its head and established that indigent 
 
90. Id. at 190.  “Indeed,” the court added, “in each instance that DASIS 
terminated Mr. Bradley’s benefits, Mr. Bradley pursued and obtained a 
judicial declaration that DASIS’ actions were wrongful.”  Id. at 190 n.4. 
91. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
92. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801; Williston, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (legal 
recourse upon losing a fair hearing is “to challenge the adverse [DAFH] by 
commencing a proceeding in New York State Supreme Court pursuant to 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78”). 
93. Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 56, at n.6. The authors conclude, 
for example, that the rate of pro se lawsuits challenging unfavorable fair 
hearing decisions is “less than one in one thousand.”  Id. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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litigants like Mr. Bradley can never obtain attorneys’ fees 
under EAJA under these tragically common circumstances.  
The Court did so, moreover, without so much as considering, 
much less distinguishing, the relevant law. 
 
III. SOLLA v. BERLIN 
 
A. Background: Facts and Decisions 
 
In September 2010, HRA sent Ms. Solla, who is indigent 
and disabled, notice of a reduction in her shelter benefit of 
more than $200 per month.94  This reduction forced Ms. Solla to 
use her disabled daughter’s Supplemental Security Income 
benefits to pay a portion of the rent, diverting those funds from 
the care of her child.95  Ms. Solla promptly appealed this 
erroneous determination, and on November 29, 2010, the State 
issued a DAFH ordering the City to withdraw its notice and 
restore Ms. Solla’s benefits, retroactive to the date of the 
reduction.96 
HRA failed to comply with the DAFH, and the State failed 
to ensure compliance within the mandatory time frame.97  On 
March 28, 2011, Ms. Solla’s counsel notified OTDA’s 
Compliance Unit of the City’s failure to comply, requesting the 
State’s assistance.98  Rather than take action, OTDA responded 
by alleging that the City had complied with the decision’s 
directives.99  It had not, as a cursory check of the shared 
welfare database would have confirmed.100 
Fortunately, Ms. Solla was able to secure the assistance of 
South Brooklyn Legal Services (“SBLS”).  In early May 2011, 
over five months after OTDA ordered the City to restore Ms. 
 
94. Solla v. Berlin, 961 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57-58 (App. Div. 2013). 
95. Memorandum of Petitioner-Respondent in Support of Motion to 
Reargue at 2, Solla v. Berlin, 27 N.E.3d 462 (N.Y. 2015) (No. 401178/2011) 
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Memo in Support of Motion to Reargue]. 
96. Solla, 961 N.Y.S.2d at 66. 
97. Luz S. v. Berlin, No. 401178/2011, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3460, at 
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 12, 2011). 
98. Memo in Support of Motion to Reargue at 4. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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Solla’s benefits, and with no other means of redress, SBLS filed 
an article 78 proceeding in New York County Supreme Court 
against both the City and State.101  The proceeding sought 
restoration of Ms. Solla’s full benefits and all benefits 
wrongfully withheld, along with attorneys’ fees under EAJA.102  
The article 78 proceeding, the trial court found, “was the only 
way left for [Ms. Solla] to get their attention after being 
ignored for months.”103 
Two weeks later, the City finally complied with the DAFH 
– and the State finally fulfilled its obligation to secure 
compliance under the controlling regulations104 – whereupon 
the case was dismissed for mootness.105  Ms. Solla then moved 
for attorneys’ fees under the theory that “the lawsuit was the 
‘catalyst’ for the favorable State action[]” ultimately secured.106  
The trial court “found that [Ms. Solla] was ‘undoubtedly’ the 
catalyst for respondents’ eventual compliance with the 
DAFH,”107 but denied the motion on the ground that Ms. Solla 
was not a prevailing party pursuant to the First Department’s 
decision in Auguste v. Hammons.108  In Auguste, the First 
Department ruled that the Supreme Court foreclosed recovery 
of fees under the catalyst theory in Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Resources.109 
On appeal, the First Department reversed course, finding 
that it was not bound by Buckhannon or its reasoning.110  In 
short, in enacting EAJA, the legislature explicitly stated its 
 
101. Id. at 4-5. 
102. Id. at 5. 
103. Luz S., 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3460, at *3. 
104. See 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-6.4; supra notes 63-64 and accompanying 
text. 
105. Solla v. Berlin, 961 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (App. Div. 2013). 
106. Id. at 57 (Under EAJA, fees can only be awarded to a “prevailing 
party.”) See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8601(a) (McKinney 2015) (providing for an award 
of fees to a “prevailing party”); infra Section III.C.1.  The catalyst theory 
posits that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party” if plaintiff secures some or all of 
the relief sought, and if the lawsuit was the catalyst for securing that relief.  
See infra Section III.C. 
107. Solla, 961 N.Y.S.2d at 58. 
108. Id. at 66; Auguste v. Hammons, 727 N.Y.S.2d 880 (App. Div. 2001). 
109. Auguste, 727 N.Y.S.2d. at 880; Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. 
v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
110. Solla, 961 N.Y.S.2d at 69. 
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intent, in the statute, “to create a mechanism authorizing the 
recovery of counsel fees . . . similar to the provisions of [the 
federal EAJA statute] and the significant body of case law that 
has evolved thereunder.”111  As the First Department observed, 
“[i]t is a critical fact that, at the time [EAJA] was enacted in 
1989, the ‘significant body’ of case law across the country and 
in New York that had interpreted the Federal EAJA routinely 
applied the catalyst theory,” as did New York courts.112  
Accordingly, the court held that “the catalyst theory applies to 
the State EAJA.”113  “It would be inconsistent with the 
laudatory goals of the State EAJA,” the court explained, “to 
interpret the legislation as depriving plaintiffs of attorneys’ 
fees simply because the State decided to concede its 
position.”114  Under such an interpretation, “aggrieved but 
impecunious parties would be hard-pressed to find qualified 
attorneys to commence cases for them, since they would have 
no assurance of being compensated.”115 
The Court of Appeals reversed.  The court did not reach 
the question whether the catalyst theory applies to EAJA.116  
Instead, the court ruled that “[u]nder the pre-Buckhannon 
federal precedent that petitioner would have us apply, a fee 
claimant recovers attorneys’ fees only if his or her lawsuit 
prompted a change in position by the party from which 
claimant seeks reimbursement.”117  The court continued: 
 
Here, petitioner seeks payment of attorneys’ fees 
from the State of New York.  But the State has 
consistently sided with petitioner regarding 
HRA’s reduction of her shelter allowance.  The 
City altered its position following petitioner’s 
commencement of this proceeding, but the State 
did not.  Consequently, petitioner could not 
 
111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8600 (McKinney 2015). 
112. Solla, 961 N.Y.S.2d at 61. 
113. Id. at 65. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Solla v. Berlin, 27 N.E.3d 462, 465 (N.Y. 2015) (“It is unnecessary 
for us to decide whether the catalyst theory is New York law, and we take no 
position on that question at this time.”). 
117. Id. at 464 (citations omitted). 
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recover attorneys’ fees under CPLR article 86 
even if the catalyst theory were New York law.118 
 
In two short paragraphs, the court eviscerated EAJA for 
poor New Yorkers.119  It did so without even addressing, much 
less distinguishing, a mountain of settled case law, governing 
statutes, and regulations requiring the opposite conclusion.  
Indeed, as we shall see, the State’s vicarious liability for the 
City’s actions is so well established and incontrovertible that 
counsel hardly addressed the issue.  This proved fateful, for the 
court eschewed the principal issue under review, namely, the 
viability of the catalyst theory, and instead ruled on the basis 
that the City, as an ostensibly independent actor, was to blame, 
and not the State.  Had the court obtained full briefing and 
argument on this issue, it is impossible to believe that it would 
have issued the same decision.  The same is true of the court’s 
unfounded narrowing of the catalyst theory itself.  Sections 
III.B. and III.C., infra, examine each of these matters in turn. 
 
B. Vicarious Liability 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Solla flies in the face of, 
and in two perfunctory paragraphs completely ignores, the 
fundamental structure of the New York welfare system.  This 
includes the relevant statutes and case law, both state and 
federal, which uniformly establish a scheme under which the 
municipalities act as the agents of the State in the 
administration of public assistance.120  Ironically, and more 
particularly, this includes Court of Appeals decisions 
confirming again and again that “county commissioners are 
denominated by statute ‘agents’ of the State department.  In 
the administration of public assistance funds . . . the local 
commissioners act on behalf of and as agents for the State.  
Each is a part of and the local arm of the single State 
 
118. Id. at 464-65. 
119. Ironically, the First Department majority had observed that if the 
dissent’s restrictive reading of EAJA were adopted, “the State EAJA would be 
eviscerated.”  Solla, 961 N.Y.S.2d at 64. 
120. See supra Section II.A. 
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administrative agency.”121 
In Solla, the Court of Appeals treated City and State 
respondents as distinct—and thus distinctly culpable—entities: 
“The City altered its position following petitioner’s 
commencement of this proceeding, but the State did not.”122  
This is a categorically erroneous distinction: when it comes to 
welfare, the City and State are one.123  It is therefore irrelevant 
what the State did, for under the most fundamental principles 
of agency law, the State is liable for the City’s actions and 
inactions.  New York Social Services law in fact expressly 
states that “[t]he county commissioner shall act as the agent of 
the department [i.e., OTDA] in all matters relating to 
assistance and care administered or authorized by the town 
public welfare officers.”124  In other words, under the law, if the 
City did it, the State did it, even if the State played no part in 
the conduct in question.125  In the administration of social 
welfare benefits, the State acts through the City, and “he who 
acts through another, acts through himself.”126 
Well over a century ago, the Supreme Court observed that 
“[i]t is well established that traditional vicarious liability rules 
 
121. Beaudoin v. Toia, 380 N.E.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. 1978) (citation 
omitted).  Accord Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (N.Y. 2003); 
Hernandez v. Hammons, 780 N.E.2d 498, 499 (N.Y. 2002); Thomasel v. 
Perales, 585 N.E.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. 1991).  See also Melendez v. Wing, 869 
N.E.2d 646, 649 n.3 (N.Y. 2007) (“The City respondents filed an answer 
asking Supreme Court to dismiss Melendez’s petition against them.  They 
took the position that they were bound by OTDA's determination after fair 
hearing, and were ‘commanded by statute to follow the guidelines handed 
down by [OTDA] concerning eligibility for public assistance, including 
emergency shelter allowances . . . .”). 
122. Solla, 27 N.E.3d at 465. 
123. See supra Section II.A. 
124. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 65(3) (1997). 
125. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.  Indeed, a 
principal is liable even for the fraud or deceit of its agent, even where the 
principal had nothing to do with the act in question.  See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991); Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Premex, Inc., 655 F.2d 779, 784 n.10 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Under 
common law principles of respondeat superior, a principal is liable for the 
deceit of its agent, if committed in the very business the agent was appointed 
to carry out.  This is true even though the agent’s specific conduct was carried 
out without the knowledge of the principal.”). 
126. LINDAHL, supra note 3, § 7.2 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *417) (emphasis added). 
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ordinarily make principals or employers vicariously liable for 
acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their authority 
or employment.”127  As the Court later explained: 
 
Undoubtedly formal logic may find something to 
criticize in a rule which fastens on the principal 
liability for the acts of his agent, done without 
the principal’s knowledge or consent and to 
which his own negligence has not contributed.  
But few doctrines of the law are more firmly 
established or more in harmony with accepted 
notions of social policy than that of the liability of 
the principal without fault of his own.128 
 
Few decisions are more manifestly incorrect than those that 
contravene the most firmly established legal doctrines. 
It is established, moreover, that this doctrine applies 
specifically to the State’s liability for attorneys’ fees based upon 
acts taken by the City on its behalf.  As the First Department 
has noted, “it is well settled that the City agency acts on behalf 
of the State agency, and the latter is held liable for any 
attorneys’ fees imposed in this context.”129  Ironically, once 
again, it was the Court of Appeals that settled this very 
principle.  In Thomasel, the Court of Appeals soundly and 
unanimously rejected the State’s attempt to distinguish itself 
from the City: 
 
The State DSS nevertheless resists the 
imposition of attorney’s fees against it, arguing 
that while the City DSS may have violated 
petitioner’s rights, the State DSS did not and 
petitioner is therefore not a “prevailing party” 
 
127. Meyer v. Holly, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (citations omitted). 
128. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 356 (1929) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  See also Meyer, 537 U.S. at 285; Brown 
v. Poritzky, 283 N.E.2d 751, 754 (N.Y. 1972) (citations omitted) (“The rule is 
well established that a principal is vicariously liable for the torts committed 
by his agent in the course of the employment.”). 
129. Miller v. DeBuono, 709 N.Y.S.2d 391, 391 (App. Div. 2000) 
(citations omitted). 
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against it.  The State DSS argues that it did 
everything in its power to restore petitioner’s 
benefits, pointing to its repeated directives to the 
City DSS, its lack of administrative capacity to 
directly deliver the continuing aid petitioner 
sought, which was the responsibility of the local 
agency, and the fact that the City DSS ultimately 
restored petitioner’s aid pursuant to the 
settlement. 
 
However, the AFDC administrative scheme 
creates an interconnected and inextricable chain 
of authority, with ultimate power reposed in the 
State DSS.  The State, under Federal and State 
law, has the duty to supervise AFDC plans and is 
authorized to sanction local districts for failure to 
comply with State DSS rules.  Local social service 
commissioners “act on behalf of and as agents for 
the State.  Each is a part of and the local arm of 
the single State administrative agency.”  
Imposing responsibility for attorney’s fees on the 
State DSS takes this structure into account and 
avoids evasion of responsibility by bureaucratic 
fingerpointing and red-tape shufflings.130 
 
Thomasel is directly on point, and diametrically opposed to 
Solla, and yet the court did not so much as mention the case in 
Solla. 
New York’s appellate courts, meanwhile, have consistently 
applied this principle specifically to the imposition of attorneys’ 
fees under EAJA: “We have recognized in the past,” the First 
Department explained in Tormos v. Hammons, “that State DSS 
may be vicariously liable for attorneys’ fees under EAJA for 
actions or inactions of City DSS, and for failing to secure City 
 
130. Thomasel v. Perales, 585 N.E.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. 1991) ) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bane, 630 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498 
(App. Div. 1995) (“Respondent’s argument that it cannot be held liable for the 
action (or inaction) of the New York City Department of Social Services was 
rejected by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Thomasel v Perales.”). 
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DSS’s compliance with its own determinations.”131  “In short,” 
the Second Department opined, “since local social service 
commissioners merely effectuate the policies of the State 
commissioner, it is the State commissioner who should be 
responsible for an award of attorneys’ fees.”132  Even more 
saliently, in Mitchell v. Bane, the court ruled that “[State] 
Respondent has the obligation to supervise the City Agency . . . 
.  It cannot evade liability under the [EAJA] statute by invoking 
the segmentation of responsibility within the bureaucratic 
structure, imposed largely for the sake of convenience.”133 
Finally, the courts have repeatedly imposed attorneys’ fees 
upon the State under EAJA for failing to ensure compliance 
with DAFHs in particular.134  Wittlinger v. Wing, an exception 
to this rule, actually reconfirmed the agency principle,135 while 
finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
 
131. Tormos v. Hammons, 687 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (App. Div. 1999) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
132. Unger v. Blum, 498 N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (App. Div. 1986). See also 
Cleary v. Perales, 594 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (App. Div. 1993) (citations omitted) 
(City’s “denial of the benefit was determined as an agent of the State 
respondent, which bears the final responsibility [for fees].”). 
133. Mitchell, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 499. 
134. See, e.g., Dicent v. Wing, 724 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (App. Div. 2001) 
(EAJA case seeking enforcement of DAFH, finding State Respondent had no 
“reasonable basis in law or fact for its inordinate delay” in ensuring 
compliance with decision); Tormos, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (citations omitted) 
(awarding fees against State Respondent, inter alia, “for failing to secure City 
DSS’s compliance with its own determinations”); Seoane-Morales v. Rockland 
Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 N.Y.S.2d 700, 700 (App. Div. 1998) (finding 
State respondent not substantially justified in a proceeding to compel 
compliance with a determination “made after a fair hearing”); In re 
Shvartszayd, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1995, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. June 26, 
1995) (rejecting the argument that “the State cannot be vicariously liable for 
the failure of the local agency to comply with the law,” i.e., two DAFHs), aff’d 
sub nom. Shvartszayd v. Dowling, 656 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. Div. 1997) 
(“The State’s failure to enforce the City’s compliance with the fair hearing 
decisions before petitioner’s institution of the CPLR article 78 proceeding was 
not substantially justified.”); Mitchell, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (awarding fees 
where City Respondent “refused to comply with the fair hearing decision, and 
. . . the State Agency . . . failed to secure the City Agency’s compliance”). 
135. Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (N.Y. 2003). Citing the 
specific page in Thomasel in which the Court of Appeals found the State 
responsible for the City with respect to fees, the court noted that the fact that 
the case involved a city agency not “directly under control of the State, is of 
no moment.”  Id. at 1273 n.3 (citing Thomasel v. Perales, 585 N.E.2d 359, 363 
(N.Y. 1991)). 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
 92 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:1 
ruling that the State was “substantially justified”136 under the 
specific circumstances at issue in that case.137 
As discussed, the federal welfare statutes similarly vest 
authority, and responsibility, in a single state agency.138  As the 
Fourth Circuit has explained: 
 
[T]he vesting of responsibility over a state’s 
Medicaid program in a single agency safeguards 
against the possibility that a state might seek to 
evade federal Medicaid requirements by passing 
the buck to other agencies that take a less 
generous view of a particular obligation.  . . . In 
sum, the single state agency requirement 
 
136. Wittlinger, 786 N.E.2d at 1274. Under EAJA, a party is not eligible 
for attorneys’ fees if the State was “substantially justified” in its position.  See 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8601(a) (McKinney 2014) (“a court shall award to a prevailing 
party, other than the state, fees and other expenses incurred by such party in 
any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds that the 
position of the state was substantially justified . . . .”). 
137. In Wittlinger, petitioner challenged respondents’ failure to follow a 
DAFH and restore his benefits for 47 days.  Wittlinger, 789 N.E.2d at 1273.  
The First Department ruled that respondents were substantially justified 
under the specific circumstances of the case, namely, that the 47-day delay 
“was sufficiently explained and not so egregious as to fall outside the realm of 
substantial justification.”  Id. at 1274.  The Court of Appeals could only 
overturn this finding upon a showing that the lower court abused its 
discretion, and this the court refused to do.  Id. (“We are unable to say that 
this determination was an abuse of discretion.”).  At one point, the court does 
erroneously assess the City and State separately, suggesting that the State 
did all it could to obtain compliance. Id. at 1273-74.  Unlike Solla, for 
instance, “the State attempted numerous times to prod the City [agency] to 
issue Wittlinger his benefits.” Id. at 1274.  To the extent that the court 
thereby sought to exculpate the principal from the agent’s actions, the court 
erred for the very reasons discussed herein.  The court’s holding, however, 
was merely that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
the delay in question was substantially justified, a finding applied to both the 
City and State respondents.  Id. at 1273.  Note, finally, that the Court’s 
refusal to disturb the lower court’s exculpation of respondents on the basis 
that “agency delays are all but unavoidable,” flies in the face of the relevant 
statutes and regulations, which mandate performance within explicit time 
frames.  Id. at 1274.  It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to critique 
this and other flaws in the Wittlinger decision.  See, e.g., Armen H. Merjian, 
Substantial Compliance Permits Substantial Suffering:  Debunking the Myth 
of a Principled “Split” in the Circuits over Mandatory Timeliness 
Requirements in Federal Benefits Law, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 191 (2002). 
138. See supra Section II.A. 
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represents Congress’s recognition that in 
managing Medicaid, states should enjoy both an 
administrative benefit (the ability to designate a 
single agency to make final decisions in the 
interest of efficiency) but also a corresponding 
burden (an accountability regime in which that 
agency cannot evade federal requirements by 
deferring to the actions of other entities).139 
 
Accordingly, like the state courts, New York’s federal 
courts have consistently imposed vicarious liability upon the 
State for the actions and inactions of the City, with respect to 
both State and federal benefits: “Under the federal and state 
statutory scheme governing the administration of public 
benefits in New York State, HRA is the agent of the State 
Defendants.”140  “[A]n attempt by defendant to avoid her 
obligation to comply with the court’s mandate by shifting the 
responsibility to the county commissioner will not be 
countenanced by this court,” the court announced in Swift v. 
Blum.141  “The state commissioner is responsible, pursuant to 
statute, for the actions of the county commissioners.”142  And in 
Henrietta D., plaintiffs sought to hold the State liable, inter 
alia, for failing to ensure the City’s compliance with DAFHs, 
 
139. K.C. ex rel. Africa H. v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107, 112 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted).  Accord Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 
1992) (“A state that chooses to operate its program through local, semi-
autonomous social service agencies cannot thereby diminish the obligation to 
which the state, as a state, has committed itself, namely, compliance with 
federal requirements governing the provision of the food stamp benefits that 
are funded by the federal government.”); Hillburn ex rel. Hilburn v. Maher, 
795 F.2d 252, 261 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (“[T]he reason for the 
requirement that a state designate a “single State agency” to administer its 
Medicaid program was to avoid a lack of accountability for the appropriate 
operation of the program.”); Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) ("The Food Stamp Act places responsibility for 
the administration of the food stamp program on the state.  . . . .While the 
state may choose to delegate some administrative responsibilities, ‘the 
ultimate responsibility for operation of the [food stamp] plan remain[s] with 
the state.’”). 
140. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(citations omitted).  See also Meachem v. Wing, 77 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (City is “the designee of State authority” and “its agent.”). 
141. Swift v. Blum, 502 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
142. Id. (citations omitted). 
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just as in Solla.  Rejecting the very reasoning applied by the 
Court of Appeals in Solla, the court ruled: 
 
[U]nder New York State law, State defendant 
has a duty to supervise City defendants in the 
provision of public benefits and services.  Indeed, 
in the administration of public assistance funds, 
“the local commissioners act on behalf of and as 
agents for the State.”  Hence, if City defendants 
have violated plaintiffs’ rights under the federal 
disability statutes, then State defendant, as City 
defendants’ principal, and as their supervisor, is 
also liable.143 
 
In fact, numerous New York federal courts have found the 
State liable to ensure the City’s compliance with the obligation 
timely to comply with DAFHs.  Thus, in Espinosa v. Shah, the 
court ordered State defendants to “provide final administrative 
action in compliance with the timeliness provisions set forth in 
[the governing Medicaid regulations] for fair hearings 
requested by Class Members.”144  Similarly, in Shakhnes v. 
Berlin, the court confirmed State defendant’s obligation “for 
ensuring the fair hearing system’s compliance with federal law 
and regulations.”145 
In Henrietta D., over the State’s objections, the court 
ordered the State “to facilitate compliance by City Defendants 
within 90 days from the date of the request for the Fair 
Hearing and within 30 days from the date of the decision after 
Fair Hearing, exclusive of any adjournment of the Fair 
Hearing.”146  And in Moore v. Perales, the court observed: “The 
state has chosen to administer these [federal welfare] programs 
through local agencies, including the City Agency.  However, 
 
143. Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), 
aff’d sub nom. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
144. Espinosa v. Shah, No. 09 Civ. 4103, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168875, 
at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014). 
145. Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 248 (2d. Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted). 
146. Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No. 95 CV 641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21849, at *74 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001). 
31
 2015 UNEQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE 95 
the state is ultimately responsible for ensuring that a fair 
hearing is held and that timely compliance with the decision 
after fair hearing is accomplished.”147  Solla contravenes every 
one of these cases, and indeed the very foundational principles 
of New York welfare law. 
The State’s liability for the City was in fact so well 
established that counsel for Ms. Solla did not brief the issue, 
focusing instead on the question whether the First Department 
correctly recognized the catalyst theory under EAJA.148  The 
words “agency” and “principal” do not appear in Ms. Solla’s 
brief.149  Ironically, Ms. Solla’s brief does cite Thomasel with 
respect to the catalyst theory, but not for the agency 
principle.150  Oral argument at the Court of Appeals reflected 
the utter lack of briefing on the subject.  Over and over, the 
judges asked the attorneys, “what did the State do that is - - - 
that’s the basis for this action to recover attorneys’ fees?”151  
Only in the very last seconds did Ms. Solla’s counsel manage to 
introduce the concept of vicarious liability: “The - - - City is 
subservient to the state.”152  Judge Rivera responded, “So it’s 
almost like vicarious liability.”153  “In some sense it is,” counsel 
replied,154 noting that a First Department case under EAJA 
found that “the State can’t just do finger pointing.155  That 
 
147. Moore v. Perales, No. CV-85-1638, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20995, at 
*5 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 1990). 
148. See Brief for Petitioner-Respondent, Solla v. Berlin, 27 N.E.3d 462 
(N.Y. 2015) (No. 401178/2011) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. at 34. 
151. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Solla v. Berlin, 27 N.E.3d 462 
(N.Y. 2015) (No. 401178/2011) [hereinafter Transcript];  id. at 17-18, (“why is 
the State to blame for what happened?”); id. at 18 (“What did they do 
wrong?”); id. at 18 (“What did they do wrong?”); id. at 19 (“But what were 
they supposed to do?”); id. at 20 (“But what - - - what were they supposed to 
do?”). 
152. Id. at 32. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. Counsel was actually referring to the Court of Appeal’s own 
decision in Thomasel, in which the court observed, inter alia:  “Imposing 
responsibility for attorney’s fees on the State DSS takes this [interconnected] 
structure into account and avoids evasion of responsibility by bureaucratic 
fingerpointing and red-tape shufflings.” Thomasel v. Perales, 585 N.E.2d 359, 
363 (N.Y. 1991).  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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they’re ultimately on the hook for - - - .”156 Those were his last 
substantive words, and with that, the court utterly failed to 
examine – in oral argument, or in its decision – the mountain 
of law establishing that the State is not “almost” or “[i]n some 
sense” vicariously liable for the City actions and inactions; it is 
unequivocally liable.157 
 
C. The Catalyst Theory 
 
“Under the pre-Buckhannon federal precedent that 
petitioner would have us apply,” the Court of Appeals opined, 
“a fee claimant recovers attorneys’ fees only if his or her 
lawsuit prompted a change in position by the party from which 
claimant seeks reimbursement.”158  Because “[t]he City altered 
its position following petitioner’s commencement of this 
proceeding, but the State did not,” the court ruled that Ms. 
Solla could not recover fees under the catalyst theory.159  Given 
that the State is vicariously liable for the City’s conduct, even 
under the court’s formulation of the catalyst theory, Ms. Solla 
was a prevailing party, since, as the court acknowledged, the 
“City altered its position.”160  Of equal importance, however, 
the court’s formulation of the catalyst theory was erroneous: 
while a change in position might be one basis for establishing 
prevailing status under the catalyst theory – if a change in 
position was the relief sought – the established criteria under 
the catalyst theory are far broader.  There is, in fact, no basis 
for the Court of Appeal’s extremely restrictive formulation, 
which contravenes both state and federal catalyst 
jurisprudence. 
 
156. Transcript at 32. 
157. Ms. Solla’s lead counsel has explained that he did not anticipate 
that the court would question the State’s vicarious liability:  “We were really 
taken by surprise at the arguments . . . that they were singularly focused on 
this issue of what the State, as opposed to the City, had done wrong.  It 
seemed like a throwaway, non-viable issue.  Our focus was on the real issue, 
whether or not the revival of the catalyst theory by the First Department 
should be upheld.”  Telephone Interview with Peter Kempner, lead counsel 
for Ms. Solla (July 21, 2015). 
158. Solla v. Berlin, 27 N.E.3d 462, 464 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
159. Id. at 465. 
160. Id. 
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 1. State Case Law 
 
While the federal EAJA fails to define the term “prevailing 
party,” New York’s EAJA defines the term as “a plaintiff or 
petitioner in the civil action against the state who prevails in 
whole or in substantial part where such party and the state 
prevail upon separate issues.”161  The Court of Appeals has 
established that in determining whether a litigant is a 
prevailing party under the statute, courts must focus on the 
relief obtained.  Hence, a prevailing party is one “who can show 
that it succeeded in large or substantial part by identifying the 
original goals of the litigation and by demonstrating the 
comparative substantiality of the relief actually obtained.”162 
New York’s EAJA also differs from the federal statute in 
two material respects that demonstrate the Legislature’s 
endorsement of the catalyst theory as a means of determining 
prevailing party status.  First, unlike the federal EAJA, New 
York’s EAJA expressly contemplates that a “final judgment” for 
the purposes of awarding fees under the statute includes 
“settlement” of the claims at issue.163  Second, when the 
Legislature passed EAJA in 1989, it expressly stated—in the 
statute itself—its intent “to create a mechanism authorizing 
the recovery of counsel fees . . . similar to the provisions of [the 
federal EAJA statute] and the significant body of case law that 
has evolved thereunder.”164  At the time, “every Federal Court 
of Appeals (except the Federal Circuit, which had not 
addressed the issue) concluded that plaintiffs . . . could obtain a 
fee award if their suit acted as a ‘catalyst’ for the change they 
 
161. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8602(f) (McKinney 2015). 
162. N.Y. State Clinical Lab. Ass’n, Inc. v. Kaladjian, 649 N.E.2d 811, 
815 (N.Y. 1995). 
163. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8602(c), with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G).  In 
Buckhannon, the Court ruled that “defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, 
although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the 
lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”  
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).  New York’s EAJA, however, expressly recognizes 
that a settlement, which is of course a “voluntary change in conduct,” may 
form the basis for an award of fees. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8602(c). 
164. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6800 (McKinney 2015). 
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sought, even if they did not obtain a judgment or consent 
decree.”165 
New York cases prior to Buckhannon similarly recognized 
the catalyst theory, whether expressly naming the theory or 
applying its precepts in practice.  Ironically, this includes a 
Court of Appeals decision directly on point, as well as a First 
Department decision directly on point.  Both involve the precise 
fact pattern at issue in Solla, and both reached the opposite 
conclusion. 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Thomasel is once again 
directly on point.  In Thomasel, the City informed petitioner 
“that her benefits would be reduced.”166  Petitioner requested 
and won a DAFH that “ordered the City attorney to direct the 
appropriate personnel to restore petitioner’s benefits.”167  The 
City, however, “persisted in not restoring petitioner’s benefits 
despite several subsequent additional directives from the State 
[agency].”168  With the assistance of pro bono counsel, petitioner 
sued the City and State.169  Prior to judicial adjudication, the 
parties settled the case: “The State and City [agencies] agreed 
to restore petitioner’s benefits . . . and to repay her the amount 
of the retroactive shortfall.”170  Petitioner then moved for 
attorneys’ fees. 
Unanimously reversing the First Department’s denial of 
attorneys’ fees, the Court of Appeals applied the catalyst 
theory, ruling that “a plaintiff need not obtain relief by judicial 
decree or formal judgment” in order to obtain an attorneys’ fee 
 
165. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s pronouncement, it appears that the D.C. 
Circuit had indeed recognized the catalyst theory as well, albeit in a case 
involving a preliminary court order.  See Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (“When a party’s success in achieving his goal results from a 
settlement, or some other event occurring before there has been a judicial 
ruling on the merits of the civil rights claims, it is necessary under the 
attorneys’ fees provision of section 1988 to determine whether there were 
colorable civil rights claims involved in the case and whether they served 
as catalysts in securing the result.”).  For a full discussion of the application 
of the catalyst theory under EAJA, see Chan, supra note 18. 
166. Thomasel v. Perales, 585 N.E.2d 359, 360 (N.Y. 1991). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 361. 
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award.171  And as we have seen, the court explicitly rejected the 
State’s attempt to evade responsibility for attorneys’ fees on the 
basis that the City, not the State, was the culpable party, since 
the State had purportedly sided with petitioner all along.172 
The facts and legal issue in Thomasel were not merely 
similar to the facts in Solla; they were precisely the same.  The 
only difference is that petitioner in Thomasel sought fees under 
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (the “Fees 
Act”).173  This is, however, a distinction without a difference.  
As the Supreme Court has established, the Fees Act’s 
“prevailing party” language174 is “virtually identical to the 
[federal] EAJA provision,”175 the provision after which New 
York State Legislature expressly patterned EAJA in 1989, 
together with “the significant body of case law that has evolved 
thereunder.”176  In Solla, however, the court denied fees, 
creating a requirement that the lawsuit “prompt[] a change in 
position by the party from which claimant seeks 
reimbursement,” without mentioning, much less 
distinguishing, its decision in Thomasel.177 
A comparison of the language utilized by the Court of 
Appeals in both cases is revealing, and highlights this glaring 
contradiction.  In Thomasel, the State argued that “while the 
City [agency] may have violated petitioner’s rights, the State 
[agency] did not . . . .”178  In Solla, the Court opined that “[t]he 
City altered its position following petitioner’s commencement of 
this proceeding, but the State did not.”179  In Thomasel, the 
 
171. Id. at 362 (citations omitted). 
172. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
173. Thomasel, 585 N.E.2d at 361; See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012). 
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
175. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 597-98 (2010).  See, e.g., Bryant v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2009) (“EAJA uses the same 
‘prevailing party’ language as §1988[.]”).  See also Premachandra v. 
Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1984), rev’d on other grounds en banc, 753 
F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985) (“Although the EAJA does not define the term 
‘prevailing party,’ the legislative history clearly indicates that the term is to 
be read consistently with its use in other fee shifting statutes.”) (citation 
omitted). 
176. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8600 (McKinney 2015). 
177. Solla v. Berlin, 27 N.E.3d 462, 464 (N.Y. 2015) (citations omitted). 
178. Thomasel, 585 N.E.2d at 363. 
179. Solla, 27 N.E.3d at 465. 
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State argued that it “did everything in its power to restore 
petitioner’s benefits, pointing to its repeated directives to the 
City. . . .”180  In Solla, the Court opined that “the State has 
consistently sided with petitioner regarding HRA’s reduction of 
her shelter allowance.”181  These diametrically opposed 
decisions simply cannot be harmonized. 
In Shvartszayd v. Dowling, as in Thomasel and Solla, 
petitioner filed an article 78 proceeding to challenge the 
“State’s failure to enforce the City’s compliance with . . . fair 
hearing decisions. . . .”182  Petitioner’s benefits issues “were 
rectified before the return date of the article 78 proceeding.”183  
Petitioner then moved for attorneys’ fees under EAJA “on the 
basis that she succeeded, as a direct result of filing her lawsuit, 
in obtaining the entire relief she sought. . . .”184  Applying the 
catalyst theory, the court explained: 
 
[I]t is not necessary for petitioner to have 
obtained the relief sought solely through a final 
judgment.  However, in order to be deemed a 
“prevailing party,” petitioner must show a causal 
connection between the ultimate relief obtained 
and the lawsuit in which the fees are sought.  In 
order to establish the requisite causal nexus, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that his or her 
lawsuit was a “catalytic, necessary or substantial 
factor in obtaining the relief.”185 
 
Like the lower court in Solla examining the same fact 
pattern, the court in Shvartszayd was “compelled to conclude 
that the institution of the Article 78 resulted in the award of 
retroactive benefits.  Accordingly, petitioner has established 
 
180. Thomasel, 585 N.E.2d at 363. 
181. Solla, 27 N.E.3d at 464-65. 
182. Shvartszayd v. Dowling, 656 N.Y.S.2d 631, 631 (App. Div. 1997). 
183. Id. 
184. In re Shvartszayd, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1995, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 
June 26, 1995), aff’d sub nom. Shvartszayd v. Dowling, 656 N.Y.S.2d 631, 631 
(App. Div. 1997) . 
185. Id. (citations omitted). 
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the requisite causal connection.”186  And unlike the Court of 
Appeals in Solla, the court comprehensively rejected the State’s 
argument that “an award of fees must be based on the conduct 
of the State and that . . . the State can not be vicariously liable 
for the failure of the local agency to comply with the law.”187  In 
doing so, the court cited the agency and vicarious liability 
principles established in Beaudoin, Thomasel, and the New 
York Social Services Law, along with the State’s obligation “to 
see that [its] lawful rulings were complied with . . . [a]nd if this 
did not happen . . . to ascertain expeditiously the reason why 
and take immediate steps to remedy the situation.”188 
The fact that the State had not changed its position was 
irrelevant to this decision; the State failed to secure compliance 
with its fair hearing decisions, relief that the petitioner secured 
by filing the lawsuit.  Hence, an award of fees was appropriate.  
Affirming this decision, the First Department opined: 
 
Twice before instituting the article 78 
proceeding, petitioner notified the State in 
writing of the City’s noncompliance, and it was 
not a reasonable response to this notice for the 
State simply to rely upon a report from the City 
that appropriate compliance action had been 
taken without conducting any independent 
investigation of its own.189 
 
Finally, in Diaz v. Franco, petitioner applied for public 
housing, but respondent “made no determination as to 
petitioner’s eligibility” until nine days after petitioner filed the 
lawsuit, finding her eligible.190  Awarding fees, the First 
Department found that the proceeding was “a catalyst of 
respondent agency’s belated eligibility determination,” i.e., for 
the relief sought.191 
None of these cases involved a “change in position” by the 
 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
189. Shvartszayd v. Dowling, 656 N.Y.S.2d 631, 631 (App. Div. 1997). 
190. Diaz v. Franco, 683 N.Y.S.2d 267, 267 (App. Div. 1999). 
191. Id. 
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State.  Instead, in each, petitioner sought to force the State to 
comply with the law.  In two of the three, moreover, petitioner 
sought the same relief as Ms. Solla: to force the State to secure 
compliance with its DAFH.  In each case, the courts, including 
the Court of Appeals, awarded fees, for each of the proceedings 
was the catalyst for obtaining the relief sought.  Solla, which 
reached the opposite conclusion, did not so much as mention 
these relevant (and in the case of Thomasel, controlling) 
precedents.  Instead, as the following section reveals, the court 
relied upon, and misconstrued, two federal court decisions 
while ignoring a plethora of federal cases that universally 
support the award of fees under the circumstances. 
 
 2. Federal Case Law 
 
Because the New York State Legislature enacted EAJA in 
1989 expressly to mirror the federal EAJA statute “and the 
significant body of case law that has evolved thereunder[,]”192 
federal case law leading up to the enactment of EAJA is a 
critical guidepost in interpreting the catalyst theory under 
EAJA.193  In determining whether a plaintiff is a prevailing 
party and thus entitled to fees, the Supreme Court in Hensley 
v. Eckerhart urged a practical approach: “A typical formulation 
is that ‘plaintiffs may be considered “prevailing parties” for 
attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue 
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties 
sought in bringing suit.’”194  Over and over again, circuit courts 
throughout the country utilized this pragmatic approach in 
applying the catalyst theory prior to the enactment of New 
York’s EAJA.  As Justice Ginsburg explained, reviewing the 
pre-Buckhannon case law: “Interpreting the term ‘prevailing 
party’ in ‘a practical sense,’ federal courts across the country 
 
192. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8600 (McKinney 2015). 
193. See, e.g., Centennial Restorations Co. v. Abrams, 608 N.Y.S.2d 559, 
559-60 (App. Div. 1994) (citations omitted) (“Inasmuch as CPLR article 86 is 
modeled after the Federal act, we turn to Federal case law for guidance.”). 
194. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (citations omitted).  
See also Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 783 
(1989) (“A prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any significant 
claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendente lite or at the 
conclusion of the litigation.”).   
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held that a party ‘prevails’ for fee-shifting purposes when its 
ends are accomplished as a result of the litigation[.]”195  “The 
standard applicable,” the Seventh Circuit explained, “is 
whether the plaintiffs have prevailed in a ‘practical sense.’”196 
Focusing on the relief that plaintiffs sought through 
litigation, the courts inquired whether plaintiffs obtained some 
or all of that relief, and whether their lawsuit was the catalyst 
for doing so.  “To justify an award of such fees,” the Second 
Circuit ruled, “the prevailing party must show a causal 
connection between the relief obtained and the litigation in 
which fees are sought. A causal connection exists if the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit was ‘a catalytic, necessary, or substantial 
factor in attaining the relief.’”197  Catalyst opinions, the Fifth 
Circuit observed, “have focused upon the type of relief obtained 
from the defendants as a result of the lawsuit.”198  As the 
Fourth Circuit summarized: 
 
[The] initial focus might well be on establishing 
the precise factual/legal condition that the fee 
claimant has sought to change or affect so as to 
gain a benefit or be relieved of a burden.  With 
this condition taken as a benchmark, inquiry 
may then turn to whether as a quite practical 
matter the outcome, in whatever form it is 
realized, is one to which the plaintiff fee 
claimant’s efforts contributed in a significant 
way, and which does involve an actual conferral 
of benefit or relief from burden when measured 
 
195. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 626 (2001)., (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
196. Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations 
omitted). Accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted) (“It bears emphasis, however, that in determining whether 
fee shifting is in order, the Court in the past has placed greatest weight not 
on any ‘judicial imprimatur,’ ante, at 6, but on the practical impact of the 
lawsuit.”); Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“More important, they achieved the practical result they sought.”). 
197. Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(citations omitted). 
198. Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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against the benchmark condition.199 
 
“Usually,” the Third Circuit explained, “a common-sense 
comparison between relief sought and relief obtained will be 
sufficient to indicate whether a party has prevailed.”200  In fact, 
every circuit to address the issue prior to the enactment of EAJA 
in New York focused upon the practical question whether 
plaintiffs obtained some or all of the relief sought in the 
lawsuit.201  If plaintiffs’ lawsuit was the catalyst for obtaining 
 
199. Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979) (citations 
omitted).  See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (“If the defendant, 
under the pressure of the lawsuit, pays over a money claim before the judicial 
judgment is pronounced, the plaintiff has ‘prevailed’ in his suit, because he 
has obtained the substance of what he sought.”). 
200. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 
911 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 
201. See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(“[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney's fees 
purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves 
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”); Gerena-Valentin, 
739 F.2d 755; Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Pierce, 789 F.2d 1016, 1019 (3d Cir. 
1986) (citations omitted) (“[O]ur first step is to compare the relief sought with 
that actually obtained.  Our second step is to determine the causal connection 
between the relief obtained and the litigation.”); Bonnes, 599 F.2d 1316; 
Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. v. Orleans Parish Sch. 
Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (“[I]n the absence of 
a judgment, a party may be entitled to fees as a prevailing party ‘if its ends 
are accomplished as a result of the litigation.’”); Citizens Coal. for Block 
Grant Compliance, Inc. v. City of Euclid, 717 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(citation omitted) (“[T]he court must first ask whether, as a matter of fact, 
the plaintiff’s lawsuit was a necessary and important factor in achieving 
the relief desired.  If it answers this first query affirmatively, the court must 
then determine whether the relief obtained resulted from a gratuitous act on 
the defendant’s part or whether defendant's actions were mandated by law.”); 
Stewart, 675 F.2d at 851 (citations omitted) (“[T]his court identified two 
criteria for determining whether a party is to be considered a prevailing 
party for the purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees: (1) whether the litigation 
benefited the plaintiff and members of the class, and (2) whether the lawsuit 
acted as a catalyst, or was a material factor in the defendant’s decision to 
change the disputed practices and therefore provide, in substantial part, the 
relief sought.”); Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(first step in catalyst analysis is determining “whether the plaintiff's suit 
served as a catalyst  -- i.e., ‘a necessary and important factor’ -- in achieving 
the relief desired”); Clark, 803 F.2d at 989 (“It is enough that plaintiffs 
received some of the benefit they sought in bringing the suit.”); J & J 
Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[A] 
person who brings an action alleging a civil rights violation, but who does not 
receive a judgment on the merits, is still a prevailing party for purposes of § 
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that relief, plaintiffs were prevailing parties.202  In 
Buckhannon, Justice Ginsburg observed that many circuits 
required a plaintiff “to demonstrate as well that the suit stated 
a genuine claim, i.e., one that was at least ‘colorable,’ not 
‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’”203 
Ms. Solla clearly satisfied these requirements.  First, she 
obtained all of the relief that she sought.204  Second, her 
lawsuit was the catalyst for securing that relief, as the trial 
court determined.205  Indeed, the trial court’s determination of 
this fact was entitled to deference, and only subject to reversal 
if clearly erroneous.206  Before the lawsuit, Ms. Solla could not 
 
1988 if he shows (1) that his lawsuit is causally linked to securing the relief 
obtained and (2) that the defendant’s conduct in response to the lawsuit was 
required by law.”); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[I]n 
order to be a prevailing party, a plaintiff must achieve significant relief to 
which he was entitled under the civil rights laws through his success on the 
merits, favorable settlement, or voluntary actions by the defendants.”); Grano 
v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (“To 
qualify as a prevailing party for attorneys’ fees purposes, a plaintiff must 
show that the ‘final result represents in a real sense, a disposition that 
furthers their interest.’  In applying this inquiry, the court must ‘focus on the 
precise factual/legal condition that the fee claimant has sought to change, 
and then determine if the outcome confers an actual benefit or relief from a 
burden.’”). 
202. See Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc., 919 F.2d 
at 381. 
203. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 627 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
204. See Luz S. v. Berlin, No. 401178/2011, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3460, 
at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 12, 2011) (“Respondents have provided petitioner 
the full relief for which she applied, leaving nothing for this court to grant.”). 
205. Id. (“Her petition appears undoubtedly to have been the catalyst for 
HRA and HASA’s compliance; indeed, it appears that it was the only way left 
for her to get their attention after being ignored for months.”).  See also id. at 
*4 (“it apparently took the filing of this Article 78 motion to get respondents’ 
attention after months of arbitrary delay”). 
206. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1081 
(10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (“Thus, the only issue before this court is 
whether the Center’s lawsuit was causally linked to the relief obtained.  This 
is a factual determination reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.”); 
Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 887 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(citations omitted) (“We subject the district court’s factual finding that Royal 
Crown’s litigation ‘catalyzed’ the appellants’ abandonment to the ‘clearly 
erroneous’ standard of review.”); Clark, 803 F.2d at 989-90 (citation omitted) 
(“Whether a litigant has shown a sufficient causal relationship between the 
lawsuit and the practical outcome realized is a pragmatic factual inquiry for 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/3
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get the City and State to restore her benefits to the correct 
amount, and to restore lost benefits.207  She appealed to the 
State for help in securing compliance with a DAFH, and the 
State did nothing, not even checking the computer system to 
confirm that Ms. Solla was still going without her subsistence 
benefits.208  After she filed the proceeding, the respondents 
finally “provided petitioner the full relief for which she 
applied.”209  State respondent finally checked the computer 
system and confirmed that Ms. Solla indeed required 
compliance.210  Third, her lawsuit was anything but frivolous.  
In every practical sense, Ms. Solla prevailed. 
The pre-Buckhannon, relief-focused approach to the 
catalyst theory is entirely consistent with the Court of Appeal’s 
approach of “identifying the original goals of the litigation” and 
“demonstrating the comparative substantiality of the relief 
actually obtained.”211  In Solla, the Court of Appeals ignored all 
of these authorities, citing two federal cases, Citizens Coalition 
for Block Grant Compliance, Inc. v. City of Euclid and Omaha 
Tribe of Nebraska v. Swanson, that do not in fact support the 
court’s restrictive formulation. 
Neither of these cases remotely states that a claimant can 
recover fees “only if his or her lawsuit prompted a change in 
position by the party from which claimant seeks 
 
the district court.  We review the findings for clear error.”). 
207. Solla v. Berlin, 961 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (App. Div. 2013). 
208. Brief for Respondent, supra note 149, at 12 (“The [State] concedes 
that [after the filing of the lawsuit], it finally reviewed the Welfare 
Management System printouts to confirm that retroactive benefits had been 
issued to Ms. Solla’s landlord and that her budget had been restored to pre-
reduction levels.”). 
209. See Luz S., 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3460, at *3 (“Respondents have 
provided petitioner the full relief for which she applied, leaving nothing for 
this court to grant.”). 
210. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 149, at 49 (“It was only after 
the filing of this Petition that the appellant changed their position from 
inaction to action and it was only then that they independently confirmed 
compliance with the Decision after Fair Hearing.”). 
211. N.Y. State Clinical Lab. Ass’n v. Kaladjian, 649 N.E.2d 811, 815 
(N.Y. 1995).  See also In re Shvartszayd, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1995, at 28 (Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. Cty. June 26, 1995), aff’d sub nom. Shvartszayd v. Dowling, 656 
N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. Div. 1997) (citations omitted) (“to be deemed a 
‘prevailing party,’ petitioner must show a causal connection between the 
ultimate relief obtained and the lawsuit in which the fees are sought”). 
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reimbursement.”212  Indeed, the words “change” and “position” 
do not even appear in these decisions.213  The Court of Appeals 
read that criterion into the decisions based upon the facts at 
issue, but the actual criteria set forth in those decisions is far 
broader; it is, in fact, precisely the same relief-focused, 
practical approach universally adopted prior to the enactment 
of EAJA. 
Thus, in Omaha Tribe, the court explained the relevant 
criteria as follows: “It is enough if a party succeeds on any 
significant issue which achieves some of the benefit sought in 
bringing the suit.”214  “The important thing,” the court 
observed, “is what relief was awarded on the facts and the law . 
. . .”215 Similarly, in Citizens Coalition, the court explained that 
the Sixth Circuit followed a “two-part standard.”216  First, the 
court must ask “whether, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff’s 
lawsuit was a necessary and important factor in achieving the 
relief desired.”217  If so, “the court must then determine 
whether the relief obtained resulted from a gratuitous act of 
the defendant’s part or whether defendant’s actions were 
mandated by law.”218  Under either of these formulations, Ms. 
Solla was a prevailing party.  And under neither is there a 
requirement to demonstrate a “change in position.” 
In both Omaha Tribe and Citizens Coalition, the court 
based its finding that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties 
upon the specific facts at issue, facts plainly distinguishable 
from the facts in Solla.  In contrast to Solla, moreover, in each 
case, the court merely affirmed the trial court’s factual finding 
that the lawsuits did not meet the requisite relief-focused 
criteria.  Thus, in Omaha Tribe, the court noted that plaintiff 
 
212. Solla v. Berlin, 27 N.E.3d 462, 464 (N.Y. 2015). 
213. See Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Swanson, 736 F.2d 1218 (8th Cir. 
1984); Citizens Coal. for Block Grant Compliance, Inc. v. City of Euclid, 717 
F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1983). 
214. Omaha Tribe, 736 F.2d at 1220-21 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424 (1983)). 
215. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  See also id. at 1220 
(citation omitted) (“To determine if a party has prevailed, a court may look to 
the substance of the litigation’s outcome.”). 
216. Citizens Coal., 717 F.2d at 966. 
217. Id. (citations omitted). 
218. Id. 
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“sought to achieve two objectives,” namely, (i) to resolve a 
dispute with defendant Swanson over leases, and (ii) “to show 
that the United States had breached its fiduciary duty to the 
[plaintiff].”219  Affirming the lower court’s determination, the 
court ruled that “the settlement reached only the first of these 
two. . . .”220  Indeed, the “settlement agreement focuses 
exclusively on achieving the [plaintiff’s] objectives with respect 
to Swanson[,]”221 and plaintiff “did not release any claims it 
might have had against the United States.”222  Hence, “there is 
nothing in the settlement agreement which indicates that the 
tribe obtained any of the relief it sought from the United 
States.”223 
The court applied a relief-focused approach to catalyst 
theory, and found that plaintiff did not obtain any of the relief 
sought against the government.  This is in stark contrast to 
Solla, where Ms. Solla obtained all of the relief she sought 
against government respondents.224  In dicta, however, the 
court in Omaha Tribe observed: “The government consistently 
had sought Swanson’s compliance; indeed, it had initiated a 
comprehensive investigation into Swanson’s affairs, and twice 
had proceeded administratively to cancel Swanson’s leases.”225  
This is in stark contrast to Solla, where State defendant did 
absolutely nothing.  More importantly, it is irrelevant to the 
holding in the case, namely, that plaintiff obtained none of the 
relief sought against the government. 
Citizens Coalition is similarly inapposite.  There, plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin the United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) from disbursing funds to the city 
of Cleveland “pending the City’s submission of an affirmative 
action fair housing program. . . .”226  The parties settled, and 
 
219. Omaha Tribe, 736 F.2d at 1221. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 1220. 
223. Id. at 1221. 
224. See supra note 205. 
225. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Swanson, 736 F.2d 1218, 1221 (8th 
Cir. 1984). 
226. Citizens Coal. for Block Grant Compliance, Inc. v. City of Euclid, 
717 F.2d 964, 965 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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plaintiffs moved for attorneys’ fees.227  Critically, applying the 
catalyst criteria examined above, the court affirmed the trial 
court’s finding that the lawsuit was not the catalyst for 
securing the relief obtained.228  The trial court found that 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate that their “action in bringing 
suit was what finally forced HUD to take a more aggressive 
stance.  Rather, the documents suggest that HUD cut off funds 
shortly before suit was initiated.”229  There was therefore 
nothing to indicate that “plaintiffs have obtained any of the 
relief they sought from HUD. . . .”230  This is the opposite of 
Solla, where the trial court found that Ms. Solla’s lawsuit was 
“undoubtedly” the catalyst for the relief obtained.231 
The trial court in Citizens Coalition noted that “HUD 
sought [the city’s] compliance all along, although no doubt not 
as aggressively as the plaintiffs desired.”232  The Court of 
Appeals apparently transmogrified this passage into the 
holding of the case, and into a finding that a change in position 
was the operative criterion under the catalyst theory in the 
Sixth Circuit.233  It was not, for the trial court found that HUD 
had already conferred the relief that plaintiffs sought “shortly 
before suit was initiated,” thus precluding a finding that the 
lawsuit was the catalyst for the relief obtained.234  This was an 
unfortunate error. 
In short, in Omaha Tribe, plaintiff did not meet the first 
relief-focused catalyst criterion, failing to demonstrate that it 
“obtained any of the relief it sought from the United States.”235  
In Citizens Coalition, plaintiffs did not meet the second 
criterion, failing to show “a causal connection” between the 
 
227. Id. at 966. 
228. Id. at 967. 
229. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Citizens Coal. for Block Grant 
Compliance, Inc. v. City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 422, 425 (N.D. Ohio 1982)). 
230. Citizens Coal., 717 F.2d at 967 (quoting City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 
at 425). 
231. Luz S. v. Berlin, No. 401178/2011, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3460, at 
*3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 12, 2011). 
232. Citizens Coal., 717 F.2d at 967 (quoting City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 
at 425). 
233. Citizens Coal., 717 F.2d at 967. 
234. City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. at 425. 
235. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Swanson, 736 F.2d 1218, 1221 (8th 
Cir. 1984). 
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filing of the lawsuit and HUD’s actions, i.e, that the lawsuit 
was the catalyst for obtaining relief.236  Ms. Solla satisfied both 
criteria, and under these cases and the significant body of 
federal case law that evolved under the federal EAJA statute, 
Ms. Solla was a prevailing party. 
The Court of Appeal’s creation of a requirement of a 
change of position under the catalyst theory doomed Ms. Solla 
to defeat (given the court’s concomitant failure to recognize the 
State’s vicarious liability for the City’s change in position).  
After all, the relief that Ms. Solla was seeking was not a 
change in the State’s position.  Instead, Ms. Solla was seeking 
to compel the State to secure its agent’s compliance with the 
DAFH, like myriad indigent New Yorkers before her.237 
A favorable DAFH that the State fails to enforce is entirely 
useless to clients, clients who are often desperate to secure 
relief.238  Requiring that such clients later show a change of 
position by the State is nonsensical, and ensures that such 
clients can never prevail on an a claim for fees under EAJA.  It 
is also contrary to an enormous body of jurisprudence, both 
state and federal, applying a pragmatic approach to the 
catalyst theory and focusing on the relief obtained.  As Justice 
Ginsburg observed in Buckhannon, “[t]he Court’s narrow 
construction of the words ‘prevailing party’ is unsupported by 
precedent and unaided by history or logic.”239 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
Every year, indigent New Yorkers file hundreds of 
thousands of requests for fair hearings to challenge the 
reduction or termination of the subsistence benefits upon which 
they and their families rely to live, from food stamps to 
Medicaid to housing assistance.  All too often, they prevail at 
the fair hearing only to see the local agency fail or refuse to 
implement the DAFH.  Their only recourse is to file suit, but 
 
236. Citizens Coal., 717 F.2d at 967. 
237. See supra Section II.C. 
238. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. 
239. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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doing so without representation is “nearly impossible.”240 
The New York Legislature enacted EAJA to enable such 
individuals to secure representation against the superior 
resources of the State in precisely these instances.241  In 
awarding fees to Ms. Solla, the First Department perfectly 
summarized the consequences of absolving the State of its 
obligation to pay attorneys’ fees when petitioners prevail in 
such lawsuits: 
 
[P]reservation of the catalyst theory is critical to 
achieving the legislative purpose behind the 
State EAJA[.]  . . . [I]f respondents’ position were 
upheld, aggrieved but impecunious parties would 
be hard-pressed to find qualified attorneys to 
commence cases for them, since they would have 
no assurance of being compensated.  It would be 
inconsistent with the laudatory goals of the State 
EAJA to interpret the legislation as depriving 
plaintiffs of attorneys’ fees simply because the 
State decided to concede its position.242 
 
Sadly, that is precisely what the Court of Appeals did in 
Solla.243  The critique of that decision, however, is not based 
chiefly upon consideration of its frightful consequences, nor 
upon the spirit and purpose of EAJA.  It is based upon black 
letter law.  That law establishes unequivocally that in the 
administration of welfare, local agencies are the agents of the 
State, and the State is vicariously liable for the conduct of its 
agents.  Both New York and federal law, meanwhile, establish 
 
240. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; Chan, supra note 18 
at 1344 (“The New York legislature enacted the EAJA in response to the 
difficulties faced by the poor in obtaining legal counsel, which had reached 
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legitimacy of the legal system itself.’”) (citation omitted). 
242. Solla v. Berlin, 961 N.Y.S.2d 55, 65 (App. Div. 2013). See, e.g., 
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 600 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“The EAJA’s admirable purpose will be undercut if lawyers fear that they 
will never actually receive attorney’s fees to which a court has determined 
the prevailing party is entitled.  The point of an award of attorney’s fees, 
after all, is to enable a prevailing litigant to pay her attorney.”). 
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that in applying the catalyst theory, courts must take a 
practical approach that focuses upon the relief secured, and not 
upon the narrow and often inapposite question whether the 
State has changed its position. 
Solla cannot be reconciled with the law, or with 
diametrically opposed Court of Appeals precedents directly on 
point, Thomasel chief among them.  There is every reason to 
believe that when the Court of Appeals revisits this issue, it 
will correct its error.  In the meantime, given that Solla is so 
manifestly wrong, lower courts should continue to apply settled 
agency principles in cases involving noncompliance with 
DAFHs. 
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